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POST-SALE OBLIGATIONS OF PRODUCT
MANUFACTURERS
John S. Allee*
I. Introduction
Reported product liability decisions have increased dramatically in
recent decades and provide a rich, though a frequently confusing and
inconsistent, source for determining the obligations of those who pro-
duce and sell allegedly defective products.' In contrast to the well
developed body of time-of-sale product liability law is the mere hand-
ful of cases that discuss post-sale obligations of product manufactur-
ers. 2 This is surprising because a potential post-sale problem is a
frequent occurrence and can arise whenever a manufacturer receives
* Partner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York, N.Y. Member of the New York
Bar. B.A. 1954, Wesleyan University, L.L.B. 1960, Columbia University.
1. Nearly 10,000 cases are reported in the Commerce Clearing House (CCH)
Product Liability Reporter, which contains only a selected number of the more
recent cases.
2. The more significant cases discussing post-sale obligations are: Gracyalny v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1983)(circuit breakers); Bly v.
Otis Elevator, 713 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1983)(lift truck); Labelle v. McCauley Indus.
Corp., 649 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1981)(airplane propeller); Jones v. Bender Welding &
Mach. Works, Inc., 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978)(fishing vessel engine); Rozier v.
Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978)(automobile fuel tank); Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975)(television set), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
913 (1976); Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971)(automobile
steering mechanism); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451
(2d Cir.)(airplane engine), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Noel v. United Aircraft
Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964)(airplane propeller); Nashida v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957)(cattle feed); Pontifex v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 226 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1955)(lawn mower); C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark
Equip. Co., 552 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (tractor); Bertrand v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982); Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats,
Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D. V.I. 1977)(seaplane); DeVito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98
F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951)(airplane); Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, 565
P.2d 1315 (Ariz. App. 1977)(block cubing machine); Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc.,
148 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 196 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983)(closure on air balloon); Balido v.
Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972); Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. McCullough, PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9611 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983)(escalator); Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107
(1971)(amusement park ride); doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d
873 (1975)(ironing machine); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99
N.W.2d 627 (1959)(automobile brakes); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner,
221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954)(cattle feed); Jackson v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins.
Co., 166 N.J. Super 448, 400 A.2d 81 (1979)(rubber sheeting mill); Cover v. Cohen,
61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984)(automobile throttle return
spring); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916)(pre-
paring and marketing of fish for human consumption); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Brad-
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notice that one of its products has malfunctioned or is found by a
court or jury to have produced a defective product. 3
The reason for a paucity of cases involving post-sale obligations is
difficult to establish by objective means. In part, it can be explained
by the extensive recall legislation adopted by the federal government
shaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)(helicopter); Kozlowski v. John E.
Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 275 N.W.2d 915 (1979)(sausage stuffing machine).
For cases involving the continuing duty of drug companies to warn of dangers in
their products, see, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922-23
(8th Cir. 1970); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 423 (2d Cir. 1969);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 ,992-93 (8th Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70
A.D.2d 400, 405-08, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (2d Dep't 1979). For cases involving the
post-sale duties of successor corporations, see, e.g., infra notes 36-40. See generally
Birnbaum, Problems of Recall, in PRODUCT DESIGN LIABILITY 299 (PLI 1981); Flem-
ing, The Duty of the Manufacturer to Recall Aircraft, 45 J. AIR LAW & CoM. 581
(1980); Patterson, Products Liability: The Manufacturer's Continuing Duty to Im-
prove His Product or Warn of Defects After Sale, 62 ILL. B.J. 92 (1973); Schwartz,
The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable
Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; Comment,
Products Liability: Post-Sale Warning, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 49 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Products Liability]; Note, The Manufacturer's Duty to Notify of
Subsequent Safety Improvements, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Manufacturer's Duty].
3. The number of cases involving post-sale product problems increases substan-
tially if cases involving the admissibility of prior similar accidents are included. See,
e.g., Rimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 641 F.2d 450, 456 (6th Cir. 1981) (prior
accidents in which fuel was siphoned through a single gas intake); Bowman v.
General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 69-70 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (information concerning
subsequent models of automobile that came into existence prior to accident held
admissible); Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 891-93 (Del. 1983)
(manufacturer required to produce claims files regarding prior accidents caused by
defective pop-lock closure on plastic container of drain cleaner); Warn Indus. v.
Geist, 343 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)(not an abuse of discretion for trial court
to have allowed reading of interrogatory in which representative of defendant-
manufacturer of winches stated date on which it received prior complaint of injury),
cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 680 (1977); Montgomery Elemiator Co. v. McCullough, PROD.
LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9611, 23,708 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)(evidence of 500 accidents
involving similar escalators held admissible); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 77 Ill.
2d 434, 437, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537-38 (1979)(forty-two prior accidents admissible to
show danger of design even though only twenty-six of them involved situation at
issue); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 415-17, 470 P.2d 135, 139-40
(1970)(subsequent accidents involving automatic door and prior and subsequent
repair orders admissible as evidence); Johantgen v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 64 A.D.2d 858,
859, 407 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (4th Dep't 1978)(prior accidents involving meat grinder
attachments); Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 S.C. 383, 126 S.E.2d
178, 179 (1962)(exploding bottle containing soft drink; three other bottles of soft
drink manufacturer exploded in same store within two week period); Rush v. Bu-
cyrus-Erie Co., 646 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(previous fatal accidents to
two men while dismantling crane boom relevant to crane boom manufacturer's
liability).
POST-SALE OBLIGATIONS
that to a large extent governs the post-sale obligations of manufactur-
ers of products such as automobiles, consumer products and boats. 4 A
more plausible reason, however, is that post-sale product problems
usually are readily definable and thus more easily resolved by a manu-
facturer than are time-of-sale problems. A post-sale product problem
is a real life problem; it usually arises in the context of a known
product malfunction causing known risks resulting from known uses
of the product. 5 A time-of-sale problem, in contrast, often involves
speculation over possible product defects, uses and risks the dimen-
sions of which cannot always be accurately predicted during the
design and testing phase of product development, 6 particularly if the
product is a drug or chemical that reacts over time with human tissue.
Because post-sale product problems frequently are readily identifi-
able and manageable and because the case law addressing these prob-
lems seems to be relatively sparse, a circumstantial case can be made
that most manufacturers are addressing post-sale product problems in
a responsible manner. This conclusion cannot be demonstrated objec-
tively, and, of course, one can always point to exceptions. In any
event, a case has yet to be made that non-judicial solutions to post-sale
product problems are not functioning well or that the apparent equi-
librium that exists between the rights of sellers and buyers should be
disturbed by innovative judicial approaches, hypertechnical criticism
of voluntary solutions or outright judicial hostility.
Part II of this Article initially will identify four instances when a
post-sale duty to warn may arise. It then will examine the unique
problems for the manufacturer presented by each of these situations,
particularly in light of the varying judicial standards set. Some courts
have suggested that the manufacturer may not only have the duty to
warn but may also have the duty to recall or to repair the product
under some circumstances. Part III will explore this limited obligation
of the product manufacturer as reflected in case law. Lastly, Part IV
will discuss the various types of post-sale product issues that are likely
4. See, e.g., National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§
1411-1420 (1976); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976);
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d
627, 634-36 (1959) (manufacturer discovered after sale that power brakes on Buick
could malfunction); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 529-30 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (discovery after sale of defective rotary blade on helicopters).
6. In recent years, however, manufacturers of products have become more
sophisticated in discovering product risks and defects during the design process. See
Molloy & Grant, Preparing For Design Litigation, in PRODUCT DESIGN LITIGATION
241 (PLI 1982). See generally Twerski, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability:
From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347 (1980).
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to arise, with emphasis on recent decisions that expand post-sale
obligations to warn and improve products by imposing unrealistic
post-sale burdens on manufacturers or that frustrate incentives to
undertake post-sale remedial measures by recognizing principles that
unduly penalize those who undertake such measures.
II. Post-Sale Duty To Warn
In most jurisdictions, a time-of-sale duty to warn of risks inherent in
the use of a product arises whenever the product seller knew or should
have known of the risks of harm,7 and the failure to provide an
7. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (providing for strict
liability failure to warn) and § 388 (negligent failure to warn), as well as the majority
of jurisdictions apply some version of the "knew or should have known" test in failure
to warn cases. See, e.g., Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)(danger of disassembling scaffolding in other than reverse order of assem-
bling); Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir.
1980) ("New York law holds the supplier of a product which it knows or should know
is dangerous if used in the usual or expected manner to a duty to adequately warn
users of the product of the danger"); Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d
1184, 1187-88 (4th Cir. 1977)(prison inmates drank "burning alcohol" and conse-
quently lost their sight; court held manufacturer knew or should have known product
would be used by some unsophisticated persons, despite warning on label "For
Professional Dental Use Only"); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n,
552 F.2d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1977)(danger of feeding urea to unadapted calves); Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973)(in deter-
mining whether manufacturer knew or should have known of danger of insulation
materials containing asbestos, manufacturer held to knowledge and skill of expert),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., 86 Cal. App.
3d 768, 772, 150 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (1978)(plastic champagne cork would eject
spontaneously within 3 to 60 seconds upon removal of wire stopper); Oakes v. E.I. du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650-51, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713
(1969)(weed killing chemical products would cause severe skin condition); Tomer v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 170 Conn. 681, 689-90, 368 A.2d 35, 39-40 (1976)
("[i]f a manufacturer knows or should know that a product may cause serious injury
to users, but does not warn of the potentially injurious effects ...he cannot be
absolved from the imposition of strict liability in tort because 'an appreciable number
of users' would not be adversely affected"); Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 294
S.E.2d 541, 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)(manufacturer could not have known small
child would be allowed to play in dumpster); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., 66
Hawaii 241 (1983); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 I11. 2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194,
198-99 (1980)(knowledge of manufacturer is element in failure to warn case); Ge-
naust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 466, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976)(manu-
facturer could not reasonably have anticipated that user would install metal tower
and antenna near electrical wires); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (drug manufacturer has duty to warn of risks
known during time plaintiff was using product); Luby v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 11 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 371 (Md. 1983) (confirming
that test is whether defendant knew or with reasonably developed human skill and
foresight should have known of presence of danger, and noting that it did not equate
this test with negligence since, if the danger were knowable, there would be liability
[Vol. XII
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adequate warning renders the product unreasonably dangerous. 8 A
minority view is that the "knew or should have known" requirement
should be elimininated and that it is no defense that the risk of harm
was scientifically undiscoverable at the time the product was distrib-
uted.9
even if there was no negligence in failing to discover it); Fiorentino v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 416 N.E.2d 998, 1002-03 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981)(jury question whether
warning on label of container of cement was sufficient when company possessed
information that product could explode when ignited by pilot light on stove); Thi-
bault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 808-09, 395 A.2d 843, 847 (1978)
(duty of manufacturer is foreseeing probable results of normal use or use that reason-
ably can be anticipated); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406, 421
N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (2d Dep't 1979) (drug manufacturer must keep abreast of knowledge
of its products as gained through research, adverse reaction reports, scientific litera-
ture and other available methods); Donigi v. American Cyanamid Co., 57 A.D.2d
760, 760, 394 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (lst Dep't 1977), aJf'd, 43 N.Y.2d 935, 374 N.E.2d
1245, 403 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1978) (defendant not liable because, in jury's opinion, it did
not know and could not have known that its product caused permanent staining of
teeth in children); Tucci v. Bossert, 53 A.D.2d 291, 293-94, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330-
31 (2d Dep't 1976) (explosion caused by mixture of Drano and water may have been
reasonably foreseen by manufacturer); Young v. Elmira Transit Mix, Inc., 52
A.D.2d 202, 204-05, 383 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (4th Dep't 1976) (defendant had knowl-
edge of dangers involved in using cement without protective clothing); Friedman v.
Medtronic, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 185, 188, 345 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (2d Dep't 1973).
8. See, e.g., Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 405-06, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81,
83 (2d Dep't 1979).
9. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447 A.2d 539, 546-49
(1982). For other cases rejecting the "knew or should have known" test or using
language suggesting an assumed knowledge of risk test, see Schneider v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 556 F. Supp. 809, 812 (W.D. La. 1983) (knowledge assumed no later than time
of injury); Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981) (in strict liability
failure to warn case it is inappropriate to use instruction that focuses on whether
manufacturer had knowledge of hazard); Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo.
391, 398, 604 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1979) (per curiam) (lack of knowledge of any prior
problems with product is immaterial to liability for plaintiff's injury); Hamilton v.
Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 385, 549 P.2d 1099, 1109 (1976)(adequacy of warning
measured by "knew or should have known" test but court held that adequacy of
warning "does not depend on knowledge of a definitive cause and effect relation-
ship"); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976) (in negli-
gence, test depends on what manufacturer should have discovered and foreseen; in
strict liability, test is what it would have anticipated had it been (regardless of
whether it actually was or should have been) aware of product's condition); Racer v.
Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("knowledge, fault or conduct
of the defendant is simply no longer relevant"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 26 (1982);
Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 63-64, 427
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1015 (4th Dep't 1980) (plaintiff need not prove that defendant knew
or should have known of harmful character of product); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach.
Co., 269 Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037-38 (1974) (en banc)(in strict liability in
design defect case, manufacturer assumed to know product's propensity to injure;
question is whether, with this knowledge, manufacturer should have taken steps to
alleviate the danger); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 95, 337
A.2d 893, 902 (1975)("the sole question here is whether the seller accompanied his
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A potential post-sale duty to warn may arise when (1) a danger that
was knowable but not disclosed at the time of sale or manufacture is
discovered at a later time;' 0 (2) a danger inherent in the foreseeable
uses of the product that was unknown and unknowable at the time of
sale becomes known at a later time;" (3) a danger resulting from an
unforeseeable use of the product becomes known because the use is
discovered after the product is sold;' 2 or (4) a risk reduction measure,
such as a more effective safety device, is developed because of a post-
sale improvement in the state of the art.' 3
A. Dangers Knowable At Time Of Sale
A clear case for requiring a post-sale warning exists when the
manufacturer learns after a product is distributed that it failed to
warn of a danger that was knowable at the time of sale.' 4 In many
situations it may be impossible to give the same type of warning after
sale as would have been required at the time of sale. For example, the
identity of the purchaser may not be known once the product is sold,
the opportunity to issue point-of-sale warnings or to attach a warning
to the product or its container may have been lost, the product may
have changed hands one or more times, or the useful life of the
product may have expired.' 5 A requirement that the manufacturer
product with sufficient instructions and warnings so as to make his product safe");
Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 817-18, 579 P.2d 940, 946 (1978) (strict
liability for failure to warn does not depend on manufacturer's knowledge of the
danger assumed), modified on other grounds, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 121, 594 P.2d 911,
914 (1979) (en banc).
The potential harshness of the Beshada result was recently emphasized by a
rebellious intermediate appellate court in New Jersey in Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,
189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (1983). That court noted that the "imposition of
the strict liability or, perhaps more accurately stated, the almost absolute liability,
principle of the Beshada approach would chill if not smother the research, develop-
ment, production and marketing of new or experimental drugs .... " Id. at 428-29,
460 A.2d at 205. It thus held that Beshada does not apply to prescription drugs,
which should be governed by a negligence standard based on what the manufacturer
knew or reasonably should have known at the time of manufacture. Id. at 431, 460
A.2d at 208-09.
10. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
14. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 109 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir.
1971); Kuhner v. Marlyn Manor, Inc., 129 N.J. Super. 554, 559 (1974); doCanto v.
Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 873, 879-80 (1975).
15. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 895-97; Comment, Products Liability, supra
note 2, at 54-58; Note, The Manufacturer's Duty, supra note 2, at 1098-99.
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give the same type of post-sale warning that it should have given at
the time of sale would not only be unrealistic, but might well discour-
age any post-sale warning since a manufacturer who cannot absolve
itself of future liability by giving a warning may have a decreased
incentive to issue a warning. Thus, although the degree of initial fault
in not discovering the knowable risk at the time-of-sale cannot be
ignored in determining the reasonableness of a post-sale warning,
limitations inherent in the ability to contact every current user should
be an important factor in the court's decision. 16
B. Danger Unknowable At Time Of Sale
In the case of drugs and other life threatening products, some courts
have recognized a post-sale duty to warn of dangers that were not
knowable at the time of sale but which became known at some later
time.' 7 The extent to which less serious dangers should be the subject
of a post-sale warning is an unsettled question that probably should be
determined on the basis of a reasonableness standard that gives proper
weight to the facts that the product was not defective when sold and
the added cost and inconvenience of post-sale warnings. Because a
warning was not required when the product was sold, the manufac-
turer should have a reasonable time to issue whatever warning is
required after it discovers the previously unknown danger.' 8
In a jurisdiction in which knowledge of the risk of harm is pre-
sumed, a manufacturer has a time-of-sale duty to warn of unknowa-
16. Cf. Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 900-01, 275
N.W.2d 915, 923-27 (1979) (it is unreasonable to hold manufacturer liable to annu-
ally warn of dangers of items mass produced when the product is six to thirty-five
years old and outdated by twenty newer models); but see LaBelle v. MaCauley
Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1981) (indirect notice not sufficient). Other
factors would include the seriousness of harm, the reliability and possible adverse
interest of the person to whom notice is given, the burden in locating the persons to
whom notice should be given, the attention the notice is expected to receive from the
recipient, the kind of product sold and the other steps taken to correct the problem.
See, e.g., Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984).
17. See Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1970);
Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Comstock v. General
Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 177-78, 99 N.W.2d 627, 634-35 (1959); see also Jones
v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, Inc., 581 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1978)(fail-
ure of fishing vessel oil cooler supply line while on ocean voyage).
18. See. e.g., C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 552 F. Supp. 340, 347-48
(E.D. Ky. 1982)(possibility that engine compartment could ignite when hose leaked
hydraulic fluid could not have been known at time-of-sale; therefore no warning was
required at that time and defendant manufacturer was not guilty on negligence or
strict liability grounds).
1984]
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ble dangers, and thus the post-sale discovery of a previously unknown
danger should not add to its post-sale warning obligations. ' 9 A manu-
facturer should have a post-sale opportunity in these jurisdictions to
absolve itself of liability for failing to disclose the unknowable at the
time of sale, but the extent to which this duty differs from the duty to
warn of risks that become knowable post-sale in a knew or should
have known jurisdiction is an unresolved question. Certainly, the
number of potential situations that call for such a warning is greater
in a presumed knowledge jurisdiction. 20 It is equally clear that a
manufacturer in a presumed knowledge jurisdiction would not have a
reasonable time to issue a post-sale warning after it discovers a risk
since it is liable for initially selling the product without a warning
until at least such time as the warning is made. But if a warning is
made and received by the plaintiff before the injury, the only issue
should be the adequacy of the warning-a question that should not
vary between a presumed knowledge and a knew or should have
known jurisdiction.
A more difficult question arises when the manufacturer issues an
adequate post-sale warning of a previously unknowable risk and dis-
tributes the warning in an adequate manner. However, a person is
subsequently prompted to use the product by an incomplete time-of-
sale warning. This person never read the post-sale warning that would
have discouraged that use, and as a result of this failure, is injured by
the product. 21 In a knew or should have known jurisdiction, no liabil-
19. See supra note 9. For a discussion of situations in which the presumed
knowledge of harm test will create liability where it would not exist under the knew
or should have known test, see Wheeler & Kress, A Comment on Recent Develop-
ments in Judicial Imputation of Post-Manufacture Knowledge in Strict Liability
Cases, 6 J. OF PRoD. LIAB. 127, 136-45 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler]. For a
critical discussion of how the elimination of the knowledge requirement in a duty-to-
warn case eliminates the distinction between the point-of-sale and the post-sale duties
to warn, see Schwartz, supra note 2.
20. The increase in liability producing situations more likely would occur in the
food, drug and chemical industries which, in contrast to the machine industry,
experience a greater combination of post manufacture knowledge of risks and an
absence of technological means to eliminate the risks once they have been perceived.
See Wheeler, supra note 19, at 136-45.
21. Such a situation arose in Schindler v. Lederle Labs., PRoo. LIAR. REP. (CCH)
1 9900 (6th Cir. 1983), in which a manufacturer of Sabin Polio vaccine was sued by a
boy who contacted polio from the vaccine because he suffered from an immunodefi-
ciency that made him highly susceptible to the disease. Id. at 25,165. The boy's
physician administered the vaccine at a time when its package insert as well as the
American Academy of Pediatrics "Red Book" warned against such use. The physician
had not read these warnings, relying instead on much earlier warnings accompany-
ing the vaccine that did not mention the immunodeficiency problem and his belief
that the manufacturer's "detail men" would advise him of any revised warnings. Id.
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ity should result from the time-of-sale warning which fully disclosed
all knowable risks. But in a presumed knowledge jurisdiction, liability
could attach because the initial warning was inadequate in that it
failed to disclose the unknowable risk; the only recourse to the manu-
facturer in such a jurisdiction might be to argue that the plaintiff's
failure to read the warning was a superseding cause of the injury. 22
C. Dangers From Unknowable Uses
A manufacturer has no point-of-sale duty to warn of dangers from
unforeseeable misuses or alterations of its product. 23 But an unforesee-
able use of a product may be brought to the manufacturer's attention
The court upheld the adequacy of the revised warnings and exonerated the manufac-
turer. Id. at 25,166.
22. Even the physician's failure to read an inadequate warning has sometimes
been held to raise a superseding cause issue. See Reeder v. Hammond, 336 N.W.2d 3,
5-6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)(failure to read warning raises jury question); Oppen-
heimer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 108-10, 219 N.E.2d 54, 58-59
(1964) (physician's failure to observe warnings, druggist's refilling of prescription
beyond expiration date, and plaintiff's failure to notify physician of side effects all
contributed to plaintiff's injury and relieved manufacturer of liability); Douglas v.
Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 478, 438 P.2d 829, 831 (1968) (physician's failure to
read label relieves manufacturers of liability); but see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow,
408 F.2d 978, 994 (8th Cir. 1969) (applying South Dakota law) (physician's failure to
learn of warning with respect to side effects of drug from sources other than drug
manufacturer did not relieve manufacturer of liability); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cor-
nish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Kansas law) (manufacturer is liable
regardless of whether plaintiff's doctor failed to read medical literature); Richards v.
Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 680-81, 625 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1980)(physician's failure
to read manufacturer's warnings in Physician's Desk Reference and drug package
inserts, and resulting misuse of drug were foreseeable; thus, summary judgment
relieving manufacturer of liability was improper); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70
A.D.2d 400, 407, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (2d Dep't 1979) (physician's failure to search
or be aware of literature does not rise to level of being a superseding cause); Allen v.
Upjohn Co., PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9173, 21,532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (drug
manufacturer liable even if physician failed to read warning); Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 424-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)(manufacturer liable where
it failed to give physician adequate warning), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d
801 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1188 (4th Cir.
1977) (applying Virginia law) (misuse of burning alcohol was reasonably foreseeable;
thus a duty to warn existed); Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 912 (Colo.
1982) (en banc) ("a duty to warn or instruct does not occur where a product's
dangerous condition is created solely by the plaintiff's own mishandling or misuse");
Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 59 Ill. App. 3d 241, 246, 375 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (1978)
(where "a manufacturer knows or should know that danger may result from a
particular use of his product, the product may be held to be in a defective condition if
sold without adequate warnings"); Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 283-
84 (Ind. 1983) (product is misused if used in a manner contrary to legally sufficient
instructions but is not misused if employer has failed to pass on to user adequate
instructions as to proper use); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d
1984] 633
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
after the product is sold, thus rendering that use foreseeable. 24 Al-
though this newly acquired knowledge may require a change in the
warning accompanying a product when it is thereafter sold, it is not
clear whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn a misuser of the
product that was sold prior to the time the manufacturer acquired
such 'knowledge. 25 However, many courts invest a manufacturer with
the powers of a clairvoyant in order to deem foreseeable product uses
that in any practical sense are unforeseeable. 26 Therefore, a manufac-
62, 72, 181 N.E.2d 430, 435, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 414 (1962) (manufacturer may not
be liable where it has warned original purchaser and that purchaser fails to pass
along warning to third party who misuses product in his presence); Prata v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 70 A.D.2d 114, 118, 420 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 (1st Dep't
1979)(manufacturer may be found liable for failing to warn user of inherent danger
of improper handling of product); Tucci v. Bossert, 53 A.D.2d 291, 294, 385
N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (2d Dep't 1976)(recovery not foreclosed by fact that manufacturer
might not foresee, or warn of, dangers of improper disposal of product).
Even in presumed knowledge jurisdictions the courts distinguish between knowl-
edge of harm or risks, and knowledge of use, and no court has held that knowledge of
use is presumed. See Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Un-
available Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 752, 758 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Wade].
24. See, e.g., Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc., 148 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 533 (1983) (use of defendant's closure in hot air balloon was discovered
after sale of product).
25. Compare Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, 460, 565 P.2d 1315, 1321
(1977) (such requirement would place intolerable burden on manufacturer) with
Haley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 353 Mass. 325, 330-31, 231 N.E.2d 549, 552-53 (1967)
(suggesting such duty and holding that defendant must give proper warning).
26. See, e.g., LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 991 (5th
Cir. 1980) (applying Louisiana law) (Ford liable for failure to warn that tread on
Goodyear tires could separate when Ford Cougar is driven in excess of 100 miles per
hour by intoxicated person); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 86 (4th Cir.
1962) (applying Virginia Law) (child drank cherry-red furniture polish left by
mother near crib; manufacturer liable for failure to warn adequately even though
label read: "May be harmful if swallowed, especially by children"); Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 348-49, 641 P.2d 258, 262-63 (Ct. App. 1981) (manufac-
turer that sells product has duty not only to warn of inherent dangers, but also to
warn of dangers involved in use which can be reasonably anticipated); Moran v.
Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 553, 332 A.2d 11, 20 (1975) (cologne caught fire when
poured over lighted candle to scent it; manufacturer liable for failure to warn that
cologne was flammable, even though type of injury may not have been foreseeable;
"it was only necessary that it be foreseeable to the producer that its product, while in
its normal environment, may be brought near a catalyst, likely to be found in that
environment, which can untie the chattel's inherent danger"); American Laundry
Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 104-06, 412 A.2d 407, 412-14 (1980) (use of
commercial clothes dryer to dry hot air balloon foreseeable); Tucci v. Bossert, 53
A.D.2d 291, 294, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (2d Dep't 1976) (plaintiff, an infant,
removed discarded can of Drano from garbage can and filled it with water, where-
upon it exploded; the court held that failure to warn about use of water in can could
render manufacturer liable, although precise accident may have been unforeseea-
ble).
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turer that ignores post-sale knowledge of dangerous misuses of his
products probably does so at its peril.27
D. State Of The Art Improvements In Risk Reduction Measures
A product may develop a post-sale problem not because of an
increase in the knowledge of its inherent dangers, but because of an
improvement in the state of the art, such as the development of a more
effective safety device. For business reasons a manufacturer may seek
to bring product improvements to the attention of its past customers,
and it would be reasonable to require that it do so in a manner that
does not underplay important safety developments in the improved
design. But a requirement that a manufacturer seek out past cus-
tomers and notify them of changes in the state of the art would be
both unreasonable and inconsistent with the well recognized rule that
a product's compliance with the state of the art is judged no later than
the time of sale. 2
8
For cases which interpret foreseeability more realistically, see, e.g., Kerr v.
Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court noted that, if tractor
manufacturer had to warn of danger of infants' riding on running board, it would
have to warn of all other equally foreseeable practices which were equally dangerous
with equal obviousness; "[t]he list of foolish practices warned against would be so
long, it would fill a volume"); McCaleb v. Mackey Paint Mfg. Co., 343 So. 2d 511,
514 (Ala. 1977) (unintended use of paint thinner); Rogers v. Unimac Co., 115 Ariz.
304, 309-10, 565 P.2d 181, 186-87 (1977) (manufacturer not liable for failure to warn
of dangers arising from lack of normal repair of commercial washer-extractor); Kysor
Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 912 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (duty to warn does
not occur when product's dangerous condition is created solely by plaintiff's mis-
handling); Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 138, 279 S.E.2d 264, 271
(1981) (manufacturer not liable for failure to warn about dangers of garbage truck
that was remodeled by purchaser); Potmesil v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 408 So.
2d 315, 319-20 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (manufacturer not liable for misuse of product
caused by failure to read instructions); Hill v. General Motors Corp., 637 S.W.2d
382, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(manufacturer has no duty to warn "in anticipation
that a user will alter its product so as to make it dangerous," even if alteration was
foreseeable); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 814, 395 A.2d 843,
850 (1978) (not foreseeable that mower would be used up and down slope rather than
around slope); Johnson v. Jones-Blair Paint Co., 607 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980) (no duty to warn that paint should not be removed by gasoline near open
flame).
27. Consider, for example, the plight of the manufacturer in Temple v. Velcro
USA, Inc., 148 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 196 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983), which discovered that
its closure device was being used in hot air balloons, a dangerous use for which the
closure was never designed. Id. at 1093, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 533. Arguably, it had no
obligation to warn such users of the danger, but wisely it chose to issue a stern
warning. The warning was approved by the court but ignored by an owner of a
balloon that crashed.
28. Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law) (product manufactured by defendant in 1963, resold as used in 1973,
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The case law is not consistent on this issue: It has been held that a
manufacturer of a faultlessly designed product has no duty to notify
customers of changes in the state of the art relating to the safe opera-
tion of the product. 29 But it also has been held that such a duty may
exist depending upon the nature of the industry, the warnings given,
the nature and intended life of the product, the nature of the safety
improvements, the number of units sold, marketing practices and
consumer expectations .3
should be judged in light of 1973 standards); Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d
932, 937 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Iowa law) (date of design); O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 182, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983) (court refers to both "time of
manufacture" and "at the time a product is designed").
Similar variations are found in state product liability statutes. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-2805 (Supp. 1983) (date product placed on market); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-683 (1983) (date first sold); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403a (Supp. 1983) (prior to
first sale); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Supp. 1982) (time design was pre-
pared, and product was manufactured); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (Supp.
1983) (when sold or delivered to initial purchaser or user); NEB. REV. CODE § 25-21,
182 (1979) (at first sale); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(b) (1980) (time placed on
market).
See also the Indiana statute creating a state-of-the-art defense, IND. CODE ANN. §
34-4-20A-4 (1983), which seems to provide that the product's design is judged by the
state of the art at the time the product is designed, its manufacture is judged by the
state of the art at time of manufacture, packaging at the time the product is packaged
and warnings or labeling at the time the product is labeled.
29. Jackson v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 166 N.J. Super. 448, 465, 400 A.2d 81,
89 (1979); see Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 959 (1966). See also Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440
F. Supp. 828, 847 (D.V.I. 1977); doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 785 n.9,
328 N.E.2d 873, 879 n.9 (1975); May v. Dafoe, 25 Wash. App. 575, 578, 611 P.2d
1275, 1277 (1980).
30. Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 901, 275 N.W.2d
915, 923-24 (1979) ("a sausage stuffer and the nature of that industry bears no
similarity to the realities of manufacturing and marketing household goods such as
fans, snowblowers or lawn mowers which have become increasingly hazard proof
with each succeeding model. It is beyond reason and good judgment to hold a
manufacturer responsible for a duty of annually warning of safety hazards on house-
hold items ...").
In Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979),
Bell developed, many years after sale of a helicopter, a safer rotary blade, in part
because the earlier model tended to develop metal fatigue. The court held Bell liable
when the helicopter crashed, reasoning that when Bell developed a safer design it
owed a duty to persons using its helicopter to refrain from allowing the earlier system
to be used and to insist that the earlier design be replaced. See also Ellis v. H.S.
Finke, Inc., 278 F.2d 54, 55-56 (6th Cir. 1960)(evidence failed to show that installa-
tion of new safety device at later time after original sale would have prevented fall of
platform); see generally Comment, The Manufacturer's Duty, supra note 2.
[Vol. XII
1984] POST-SALE OBLIGATIONS
III. Post-Sale Duty To Recall Or Repair
A few cases have involved post-sale repairs by a manufacturer or
have discussed post-sale duties to remedy a defective product." These
cases, however, involved defects that appear to have been knowable
at the time the product was sold or manufactured. Properly under-
stood then, nothing more is established than that a manufacturer of a
defective product can "absolve itself from future liability" by taking
"reasonable steps to correct its error." 32 Far from creating an obliga-
tion to repair, these decisions merely suggest the steps that can be
taken to relieve a manufacturer of a potential liability based on its
having sold a defective product. No case has imposed a common law
tort duty to recall or unequivocably held that a tort duty to recall or
repair exists where there is not a potential liability for selling the
product in the first place.33
31. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d
Cir.) (airplane manufacturer that was aware that design change caused increased
scuffing but took no action to remedy may be liable in the event of a crash; "[i]t is
clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous defects in design have
come to the manufacturer's attention, the manufacturer has a duty either to remedy
these or, if complete remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings
and instructions concerning methods for minimizing the danger"), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 959 (1969); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 1964)
(manufacturer under duty to improve propeller system where it was aware system
endangered public safety); Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633,
645, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 898 (1972) (series of warnings given owner by manufacturer
absolves manufacturer of liability); Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md.
141, 150, 274 A.2d 107, 112 (1971) (manufacturer's letters to customer that it would
replace part believed to be subjected to strains not originally considered deemed
adequate notice to customer).
32. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1972).
33. See National Women's Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robins Co., 545 F.
Supp. 1177, 1180-81 (D. Mass. 1982) (no common law duty to recall exists under
state law with respect to allegedly defective IUD); but see Noel v. United Aircraft
Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 1964) (court's language suggests that manufacturer
had continuing post-sale duty to develop and provide to its past customers an im-
proved propeller system; court had second thoughts about far-reaching implications
of such suggestion because, on rehearing, it belatedly emphasized that product was
defective as sold).
The existence of a common law tort remedy to repair, recall or remedy a defect is
negated by the requirement in some cases that, absent an accident, injury to the
property itself resulting from a defect is economic harm, recovery for which is not
provided by the law of torts. See, e.g., Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 250-51
(Alaska 1977); Vendermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 258, 391 P.2d 168,
170, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898 (1964); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga.
383, 306 S.E.2d 253, 256-57 (1983); Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ill. App.
3d 201, 202, 454 N.E.2d 740, 741 (1983); John R. Dudley Constr. Inc. v. Drott Mfg.
Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 371, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513-14 (4th Dep't 1979).
Of course, a requirement to recall, remedy or repair could be imposed if the
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The case law is still unclear as to what steps a manufacturer must
take to absolve itself of future liability. A manufacturer should be able
to avoid this liability if it (1) offers free-of-charge repairs, (2) commu-
nicates that offer in time to prevent an accident, and (3) warns of the
risks and dangers involved in using the unrepaired product.3 4 Any
measure short of this may raise an issue of fact for the jury. However,
in some instances, even a warning or some other measure that falls
short of eliminating the risk entirely, but which clearly puts the owner
of the product on notice and indicates how the risk can be reduced,
may be sufficient to exonerate the manufacturer on superseding cause
grounds if the warning and risk-reducing measures are ignored. 35
breach of warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were still applicable
to the transaction. See U.C.C. § 2-602 (1978) (rejection of goods); id. § 2-608
(revocation of acceptance of goods); id. § 2-719 (limitation of remedy to repair and
replacement of parts).
34. In Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971),
the manufacturer of an amusement park ride determined after the sale that the
design of the ride's shaft was dangerous. He warned the purchaser and shipped a
replacement shaft free of charge. The purchaser continued to operate the ride with
the old shaft, which broke, injuring a rider. The manufacturer, after settling with
the rider, sought indemnity from the purchaser. Id. at 144-46, 274 A.2d at 109-10.
The appellate court affirmed a trial court judgment for the manufacturer, noting,
among other facts, that (1) the buyer was aware of the risks, (2) the manufacturer
had shipped a new shaft free of charge and had sent warnings, and (3) any mechanic
could have replaced the shaft. Id. at 147-50, 274 A.2d at 111-12. But see Balido v.
Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972), in which the
manufacturer of a molding press offered to sell for $500 a package of safety devices to
correct a design defect in presses previously sold. The plaintiff suffered an injury
from a press owned by her employer, who had received the manufacturer's offer to
sell the safety package as well as a warning of the dangers in the unfixed product.
The court held that it was for the jury to decide whether the warnings were sufficient
or whether the manufacturer also should have offered to provide the safety package
for free. Id. at 648, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01.
As a general proposition it can be said that a manufacturer who has taken
all reasonable steps to correct its error may succeed in absolving itself from
future liability ....
The infinite variety of factual situations arising out of corrective efforts
highlights the factual nature of an inquiry as to whether the manufacturer
has done what it could reasonably be expected to do to correct an earlier
design deficiency. Central to the inquiry here is the question whether
under the particular circumstances the manufacturer could have reasona-
bly foreseen that the neglect of third persons to respond to the manufactur-
er's warnings of danger would frustrate its corrective efforts . . . . It is also
a question of fact whether the manufacturer . . . could reasonably foresee
that a purchaser of the product would not spend additional money to
correct the deficiency.
Id.
35. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d
Cir.) (applying New York law)("after ...a product has been sold and dangerous
defects in design have come to the manufacturer's attention, the manufacturer has a
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IV. Recent Developments
A few recent decisions significantly affect the post-sale obligations
of product manufacturers and sellers. These decisions affect:
-the persons who must issue post-sale warnings; 36
-the persons who must receive those warnings; 37
-the remedial obligations of a manufacturer; 38 and
-the incentive to issue a post-sale warning.39
A. Persons Who Must Warn-Successor Corporations
Post-sale duties to warn generally arise when the product manufac-
turer or seller learns of a product defect after the product has been
distributed. A few decisions have imposed this post-sale obligation on
a successor to the corporation that sold the product. 40 A recent deci-
sion by the New York Court of Appeals, Schumacher v. Richards
Shear Co.,4 has substantially broadened the circumstances under
which a successor corporation may be liable for failure to issue a post-
sale warning to its predecessor's customers.42
Plaintiff Schumacher was blinded in one eye in 1978 from a shear-
ing machine that was purchased by his employer from Richards Shear
Company in 1964. The machine was allegedly defective because it did
not have a guard to deflect metal ejected from the machine. Defend-
ant Logemann Brothers Company acquired the right in 1968 to man-
ufacture Richards Shear products, but it did not thereafter produce
the machine in question or maintain an inventory of those machines.
Logemann's only direct contact with the plaintiff's employer after the
acquisition was the rendering of repair service on one occasion in 1968
on the power unit of the Richards Shear machine and the solicitation
of service business on two occasions. 43
The court rejected as inapplicable traditional theories of successor
corporation liability based on express or implied assumption of tort
duty to either remedy these or, if complete remedy is not feasible, at least to give
users adequate warnings and instructions concerning methods for minimizing the
danger"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCul-
lough, PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9611 (Ky. App. Ct. 1983) (proximate cause issue
raised when owner of escalator ignored warnings of danger and recommendations by
manufacturer of changes that would reduce the risk).
36. See infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
41. 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983).
42. Id. at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 199, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
43. Id. at 244, 451 N.E.2d at 196-98, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40.
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liability, consolidation or merger, the continuation of the selling cor-
poration in the form of the purchasing corporation or fraud. 44 Nor did
it find applicable the more recent extensions of successor liability
based on the "continuity of the enterprise" 45 or "product-line" theo-
ries. 46 Instead, the court chose to substantially extend existing author-
ity on a successor corporation's duty to warn 47 by holding that a jury
could find such a duty arising out of the "relationship" created by
Logemann's meager contacts with plaintiff's employer. 48 The court
ultimately found that Logemann's servicing of a non-defective aspect
of the machine created a jury issue concerning whether it knew or
should have known of the alleged design defect because the evidence
indicated that this defect was "open and notorious" based on prevail-
ing industry standards. 49 Paradoxically, the court refused to follow the
overwhelming precedent that relieves a manufacturer of its duty to
warn of open and obvious defects. 50
44. Id. at 245, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440. See, e.g., Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 823, 373 N.E.2d 364, 402
N.Y.S.2d 565 (1977). See generally Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor
Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 908 (1983).
45. 59 N.Y.2d at 245, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440. See Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 424-25, 244 N.W.2d 873, 881 (1976). The
"Continuity of the Enterprise" theory is found where the successor corporation is in
actuality a continuation of the predecessor corporation. A key factor considered is the
common identity of officers, directors and stockholders of the buyer and the seller.
See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439-40 (7th Cir. 1977); Pele v.
Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343, 314 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
46. 59 N.Y.2d at 245-46, 451 N.E.2d at 198-99, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41. See Ray
v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 34, 560 P.2d 3, 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 582 (1977). The
"Product Line" theory is found when the successor corporation continues producing
the same line of products as had the predecessor corporation. See Leannais v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir. 1977).
47. Other cases that have discussed a duty to warn in such situations require that
the successor corporation establish a much closer relationship to the owner of the
product than that in Schumacher. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863
(9th Cir. 1980) (relationship not sufficient to impose a duty to warn); Travis v. Harris
Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1977) (single service call clearly insufficient to
create such a duty); Cowan v. Harris Corp., PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 9667
(U.S.D.C. Kan. 1982) (no duty to warn when no continuing relationship and no
knowledge of existence or location of product in question); Shane v. Hobam, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 526, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (purchase of assets of corporate manufacturer
alone does not support product liability claim); Gonzalez v. Rockwool Eng'g &
Equip. Co., 117 111. App. 3d 435, 438, 453 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1983)(successor did not
have duty to warn when it did not succeed to service contracts of predecessor, nor
service particular machine in question under a service contract); Pelc v. Bendix
Mach. Tool Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343, 352, 314 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1981)(successor
must have control over product); Adducci v. Skyworker Div. of Concrete Mfg.
Corp., PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 9462 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
48. 59 N.Y.2d at 246-48, 451 N.E.2d at 199-200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42.
49. Id. at 249, 451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
50. Id. See, e.g., Brech v. J.C. Penney Co., 698 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1983)
(flammability of cotton flannelette nightgown is open and obvious); Haines v. Po-
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wermatic Houdaille, Inc., 661 F.2d 94, 96 (8th Cir. 1981) (table saw); Burton v.
L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1976) (flammability of
kerosene); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1187 (5th Cir. 1971) (obvious-
ness of dangerous qualities of meat grinder); Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d
560, 563-64 (7th Cir.) (forklift truck with no overhead guard to be used in high stack
areas), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc.,
114 Ariz. 159, 162, 559 P.2d 1074, 1077-78 (1976) (pork must be cooked); Holmes v.
J.C. Penney Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 216, 220, 183 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1982) (pellet
gun using C02 cartridges); Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 560, 566,
150 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (1978) (characteristics and age of blasting cap considered to
account for its dangerous qualities); Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 40 Colo.
App. 417, 576 P.2d 197, 198 (1978) (B-B gun); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 427
So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(danger of releasing emergency brake while
car was running in gear was obvious); Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 364 So. 2d 1243,
1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (per curiam) (torch applied to hot oil), remanded per
curiam, 380 So. 2d 1035, aff'd in part per curiam, 383 So. 2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 294 S.E.2d 541, 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
(danger was obvious that child should not play inside dumpster-type trash con-
tainer); Vance v. Miller-Taylor Shoe Co., 147 Ga. App. 812, 813, 251 S.E.2d 52, 53
(1978) (new shoes slip); Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 466, 343
N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976) (electricity is dangerous); Fanning v. LeMay, 38 I11. 2d 209,
212, 230 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1967) (shoes are slippery when wet); Miscevich v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 110 111. App. 3d 400, 404, 442 N.E.2d 338, 342 (1982)
(electricity is dangerous); Ebbert v. Vulcan Iron Works, Inc., 87 Ill. App. 3d 74, 76,
409 N.E.2d 112, 114 (1980) (possibility that air hose might disconnect from pile
driver machine was well known to all familiar with it); Zidek v. General Motors
Corp., 66 Ill. App. 3d 982, 985, 384 N.E.2d 509, 512 (automobiles skid on ice);
Kerns v. Engelke, 54 111. App. 3d 323, 331, 369 N.E.2d 1284, 1290 (1977) (jury
question whether it was obvious that forage blower could be moved without remov-
ing power takeoff assembly), modified on other grounds, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d
859 (1979); Ostendorf v. Brewer, 51 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1015, 367 N.E.2d 214, 218
(1977) (necessity of securing gasoline cap of tractor after refueling); Coffman v.
Austgen's Elec., Inc., 437 N.E.2d 1003, 1008 (1982) (danger of sticking hand into
portable grain auger is known or should be known to user); Bemis Co. v. Rubush,
427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1981) (batt packing machine), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825
(1982); Lowell v. Earl Grissmer Co., 422 So. 2d 1344, 1350 (La. Ct. App. 1982)(elec-
tricity and water); Braxton v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 419 So. 2d 125, 130 (La. Ct. App.
1982) (electricity); Thornhill v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 385 So. 2d 336, 338
(La. Ct. App. 1980) (placing leg in opening of auger conveyor system); Webster v.
Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 415, 418, 198 N.E.2d 309, 312 (1964) (fish bone
in chowder); Mach v. Terex Div. of General Motors Corp., 112 Mich. App. 158, 163,
315 N.W.2d 561, 564 (1982) (jump-starting bulldozer); Durkee v. Cooper of Can-
ada, Ltd., 99 Mich. App. 693, 697, 298 N.W.2d 620, 622 (1980) (hockey helmet);
Hensley v. Muskin Corp., 65 Mich. App. 662, 664, 238 N.W.2d 362, 362 (1975) (per
curiam) (diving from seven-foot high roof into four-foot-deep swimming pool); Sky-
hook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 147-48, 560 P.2d 934, 938-39 (1977) (high
voltage electricity); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75
A.D.2d 55, 65, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1015 (4th Dep't 1980) (storage of portable
propane gas cylinder next to water heater with pilot light); Brown v. Tennessee
Donut Corp., PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 8148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (hot coffee);
Cantu v. John Deere Co., 24 Wash. App. 701, 708, 603 P.2d 839, 842 (1979)
(spinning unguarded shaft on tractor); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash.
2d 474, 480, 573 P.2d 785, 789 (1978) (en banc) (camp stove).
Although most jurisdictions have eliminated the obviousness or patent defect rule
in design defect cases, many of these jurisdictions have continued to treat the obvi-
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The court's decision in Schumacher can be criticized on many
grounds, but the most troubling is its suggestion that a post-sale duty
to warn of design defects can be imposed on a non-manufacturer or
seller that sporadically services or offers to service a product.5 The
ousness of the danger of a product as relieving its manufacturer of any duty to warn.
The reason is clear: The obviousness of the danger in a defect case should properly
relate only to the plaintiff's culpability in ignoring the obvious, and is best treated not
as an absolute bar to plaintiff's recovery, but as contributory or comparative fault.
On the other hand, in a warning case the obviousness of danger requirement is
focused not on plaintiff's appreciation of the danger, but on the scope of the manu-
facturer's duty to warn as determined by those aspects of the dangers that are
communicated by the product itself. Many objects are as capable of communicating
their dangerous qualities as words or symbols are, and if a warning would add
nothing to what is already obvious, the warning would not decrease (or its absence
increase) the risk of harm. See Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 287 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (applying New York law) ("[n]or does the rationale for eliminating the patent
danger rule on design defects apply to the duty to warn. Obviousness should not
relieve manufacturers of a duty to eliminate dangers from their design if that can
reasonably be done, but obviousness relieves the manufacturer of the duty to inform
users of a danger"); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 37,
616 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1981) ("there is no duty on the part of a manufacturer to warn
of a danger when the dangerous defect is open and obvious"); Michigan Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Heatilator Fireplace, 126 Mich. App. 837, 842 (1983) (no duty to warn exists if
defect is obvious and product is "simple tool or product," but duty does exist if
product is more complex) (relying on Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413,
326 N.W.2d 372 (1982)). But see Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530,
537 (N.D. 1977) (obviousness of danger should not automatically relieve manufactur-
ers of liability).
51. Repairers who did not manufacture the product generally are held to a lesser
standard than repairers who manufactured the product. See Johnson v. William C.
Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1979) (court emphasized
that in many cases installer or repairer would not have knowledge or opportunity to
recognize defects and to require full examination of products serviced would increase
consumer's cost); Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (applying Pennsylvania law) (plaintiff's remedy is in negligence); Slayton v.
Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 222, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 (1969) (installer);
McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1965) (druggist); Hoffman v.
Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37-38, 539 P.2d 584, 589-90 (1975) (repairer of
airplane not suable in strict liability, but can be sued for implied warranty that
services would be performed in workmanlike manner, i.e., non-negligently); Nickel
v. Hyster Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 773, 412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (1978) (purchaser of
vehicle was not permitted to sue in strict liability repairer of vehicle, who did not sell
product). See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 404 (1965); Note, Applica-
tion of Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of
Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865 (1977).
Seller-repairers, on the other hand, have been held liable in strict liability. See
Young v. Aro Corp., 36 Cal. App. 3d 240, 111 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1974); Winters v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App. 1977); Jackson v. Melvey, 56
A.D.2d 836, 392 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1977) (warranty); but see Winans v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1983) (manufacturer of jet
engines that exploded in mid-air not liable in strict liability for defects that existed
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imposition of a duty to warn may be appropriate when the service
involves rebuilding the entire product,52 when a manufacturing flaw
is or should have been discovered in the course of service work or
perhaps even when the successor has undertaken to provide general
maintenance of the product.5 3 But an isolated service call ten years
before the accident and two solicitations of service work54 is a tenuous
basis on which to assume that a servicer of a product has the expertise
to appreciate dangers lurking in its design, or that it has a special duty
to warn of a design defect that is just as open and obvious to the owner
and user of the product as it is to the service company.
B. Persons Who Must Be Warned
A duty to warn extends to foreseeable users of a product including,
at times, the employees of the purchaser. 55 But the duty to warn may
be discharged by warning only the employer when it is a knowledge-
able industrial user of the product, is well aware of its risks, and can
be expected to supervise the use of the product and issue appropriate
warnings to its employees.56
after manufacturer overhauled the engines). See also Various Underwriters at Lloyds
v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 831, 836 (W.D. La. 1975) (applying Louisiana
law)(reassembly and overhaul of aircraft engine parts).
52. Cf. Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D.
1983) (strict liability applies to rebuilders of goods).
53. See generally Gonzalez v. Rockwool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d
435, 453 N.E.2d 792 (1983).
54. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d
430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962); see supra note 52.
56. McWaters v. Steel Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(supplier of steel rods held not strictly liable for death of construction company
employee where employer was experienced highway contractor and supplier had no
control over use of rods); Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465-67 (5th
Cir. 1976) (lack of sufficient warning must be considered together with the knowl-
edge and experience of those who could reasonably be expected to use product);
Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1969) (no
duty to warn those who follow directions of engineers or technicians exists when
manufacturer gives those engineers or technicians sufficient warning or if they have
knowledge of dangers involved); Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218, 223
(Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (duty to warn was only to employer where manufacturers of
dry cleaning machines had no control over use of its machines or employee's work
area); Shanks v. A.F.E. Indus., 416 N.E.2d 833, 836-38 (Ind. 1981) (manufacturer
may fulfill its duty to warn employees by warning employer when manufacturer has
no control over work space, hiring, instruction or placement of personnel and man-
ner of integration of product into employer's operation); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348, 365 (1983) (the "hooking up of a natural gas well is a
highly specialized industrial activity . . . . This may be distinguished from the
operation of a machine commonly used by low echelon personnel or laborers where a
simple warning on the machine may be necessary .... Misco and Ciba-Geigy are
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A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,57 fails to
give proper weight to this principle in the context of a post-sale
warning. The plaintiffs were employees or representatives of employ-
ees of the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS) who were
seriously burned in 1979 when a circuit breaker manufactured and
not under a duty to provide each employee of the installer of their products with the
manual on proper installation ..."); Bonhert Equip. Co. v. Kendall, 569 S.W.2d
161, 165-66 (Ky. 1978) (where manufacturer warns buyer or buyer agrees to assume
responsibility for installation of bracing for crane, manufacturer will not be liable to
injured employee); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Ky. 1976)
(machine manufacturer may assume owner/employer will maintain machine in safe
working order); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 324, 364 N.E.2d
267, 272 (1977) (manufacturer had no duty to warn purchaser of danger of assembly
when purchaser was aware guards could be purchased to avoid such danger); Sch-
meiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 273 Or. 120, 133, 540 P.2d 998, 1005 (1975) (adequate
warnings and instructions to contractor on assembly of joist relieved manufacturer of
its duty to warn contractor's employees); Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App.
718, 722-25, 591 P.2d 478, 480-81, aff'd, 93 Wash. 2d 5, 604 P.2d 164 (1979)
(manufacturer who had properly warned employer of hazards of using caustic soda
was relieved of duty to warn employees); but see Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co.,
723 F.2d 370, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1983) (manufacturer's negligence in failing to warn
cleaning people of danger that meat mixer-blender machine could start by itself was
jury question); Hopkins v. Chip-in-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1980)
(manufacturer not relieved of duty to warn about removal of safety device when
warning conveyed only to purchaser and when foreseeable that purchaser-employer
would not convey warning to employees); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works,
574 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (warning attached to machine
required when information of dangerous propensity is supplied to plaintiff's em-
ployer in service manual); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815
(9th Cir. 1974) (manufacturer could be held liable when employer knew of hazards
and failed to communicate them to employee); Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448
N.E.2d 277, 281-83 (Ind. 1983) (duty to warn cannot be delegated completely to
employer where product installed is not a component in a multi-faceted operation
and equipment such as ram press operates independently of all others); Seibel v.
Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 54-57 (N.D. 1974) (manufacturer held liable where
technical manual furnished employer never reached employee and no other warning
was provided).
Of course, if the manufacturer supplies only limited information to the employer,
his duty to the employee will not be discharged. See Billiar v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1980) (duty is not discharged where label
merely warns of harmful propensities; warning must be sufficient to apprise fully of
danger); Kammer v. Lamb-Grays Harbor, 55 Or. App. 557 (1982). See also Model
Uniform Product Liability Act § 104(C)(5) (1979), providing that the manufacturer
"is under an obligation to provide adequate warnings or instructions to the actual
product user unless the manufacturer provided such warnings to a person who may
be reasonably expected to assure that action is taken to avoid the harm, or that the
risk of the harm is explained to the actual product user."
57. 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co.,
723 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1983)(mixer-blender machine manufacturer liable as em-
ployee not contributorily negligent in cleaning machine as instructed).
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sold by Westinghouse exploded. The circuit breaker had been de-
signed in 1959, and in 1964 and 1965 Westinghouse learned that a few
units of the model circuit breaker sold to WPS had malfunctioned. A
Westinghouse engineer assigned to investigate the problem discovered
the source of the malfunction and designed a baffle that would elimi-
nate it. Westinghouse then informed WPS by letter that a number of
units had malfunctioned, and cautioned that failure could cause ex-
tensive damage to equipment and personnel. The manufacturer of-
fered to supply baffles without charge to be installed by WPS. WPS
wrote back to Westinghouse requesting baffles for seven breakers,
including the three breakers located at the Quincy Street substation
where the accident took place and one breaker of a type not men-
tioned by Westinghouse in its letter. Westinghouse promptly sent six
baffles, and WPS installed five of these baffles on breakers, including
only two of the three breakers at the Quincy substation. Fifteen years
later the third breaker at the substation exploded. No circuit breaker
equipped with a baffle ever failed. 58
In reversing summary judgment in favor of Westinghouse, the court
stated that "[p]erhaps Westinghouse should have also undertaken to
warn WPS employees who came into direct contact with the circuit
breakers."59 It is difficult to understand how Westinghouse was sup-
posed to ascertain in 1965 the identity of those who would come in
contact with the breaker over the many years of its use or how a
warning to these employees would have prompted their employer to
respond more responsibly to Westinghouse's warning. In any event,
the court's opinion indicates that Westinghouse had every reason to
believe that a sophisticated purchaser such as WPS had the expertise,
incentive and opportunity to make the modification to the breakers,
and that Westinghouse had no reason to foresee that it would not be
made.
C. Post-Sale Remedial Measures
The Gracyalny decision also exhibits an excessively critical ap-
proach to Westinghouse's efforts to remedy the breaker malfunction
and an unwarranted indulgence of WPS' negligent failure to modify
the third Quincy substation breaker. Despite Westinghouse's warning
of the risk of harm and the potential for causing personal injury and
offering free corrective measures, that court found a jury issue on the
58. 723 F.2d at 1313-15.
59. Id. at 1321.
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sufficiency of those measures because the jury might find that:
(1) the language of the Westinghouse warning letter minimized the
danger presented by the defective breakers;6 0
(2) Westinghouse was negligent in failing to follow up its letter
with another letter or a personal visit to verify that the baffles were
properly installed;6 1
(3) Westinghouse should have undertaken to install the breaker
itself; 2 or
(4) the defect was not rendered "open and obvious" by the Wes-
tinghouse letter and the furnishing of baffles.63
The court based its decision primarily on authority that post-sale
obligations can include a duty to advise of changes in the state of the
art, 6 4 that ambiguities in the language of a warning should be con-
strued against the party mailing the warning, that the open and
obvious exception to the duty to warn does not necessarily apply when
the user may not fully appreciate the risk, and that a manufacturer
may not delegate to the user the duty to design and manufacture a
defect-free product.65 Finally, the court ruled that WPS' failure to
60. The Westinghouse letter suggested that the installation could be made at a
convenient inspection time and that it would not be necessary to initiate an immedi-
ate program to install the baffles. Id. at 1315. It seems unlikely that this language
forestalled any attempt to install the third Quincy substation baffle during the fifteen
years that elapsed after the letter was sent.
61. Given the sophistication of WPS, it seems unreasonable to impose on Wes-
tinghouse a duty to warn twice.
62. The implication that those who sell equipment to electric power companies
have a duty to install the equipment is astonishing.
63. Id. at 1321-22. The defect was certainly open and obvious, and from the
standpoint of WPS, an adequate warning was given. In any event, the open and
obvious rule is a substitute for a warning requirement, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text, and has no place in a case in which an unequivocal warning has
been issued.
64. See supra note 45.
65. 723 F.2d at 1318-21. The rule that prohibits, under certain circumstances, a
manufacturer from delegating the duty to manufacture a defect free product has
never been used to require a manufacturer to assemble the entire product and should
be satisfied when the manufacturer supplies the safety device to a sophisticated
supplier. Indeed, even when the manufacturer expects the purchaser to provide and
install the safety device, the result under the delegation-of-duty rule generally turns
on such factors as feasibility, custom and expertise. See, e.g., Heckman v. Federal
Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 1978) (whether manufacturer, as opposed to
purchaser, must provide safety features depends on "feasibility of incorporating
safety features during manufacture . . . the likelihood that users will not secure
adequate devices, whether the machinery is of a standard make or built to the
customer's specifications, the relative expertise of manufacture and customer, the
extent of risk to the user, and the seriousness of injury which may be anticipated");
Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 387-89 (3d Cir. 1978) (as between final
assembler and component manufacturer, responsibility for providing safety device
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install the baffle was not a superseding cause of the accident since its
negligence may have been foreseeable."6
should be determined on basis of trade custom, relative expertise of parties and stage
of installation which is most feasible); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574
F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Mississippi law) ("[t]he machine having
been designed for many kinds of operation, it was incumbent upon the machine
purchaser to select safety devices appropriate for his particular function"); Lesnefsky
v. Fischer & Porter Co., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 951, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(manufacturer
of component part made to specification of buyer not liable for injuries sustained as a
result of defect in product); Stephenson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d
380, 384-85, 428 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1981)(jury question whether safety device at-
tached to machine by employer corrected dangerous condition of machine when sold
by defendant-manufacturer); Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 12 Ill. App. 3d
739, 745-48, 299 N.E.2d 86, 92-93 (1973)(duty of supplying safety device rested on
purchaser, not manufacturer), afJ'd, 59 Ill. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974); Fredericks
v. General Motors Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 720-21, 311 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1981)(fail-
ure of supplier to provide guard for power press did not result in liability); Elliot v.
Century Chevrolet Co., 597 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)(manufacturer
and dealer had no duty to install back-up buzzer on truck; third party that had
installed beer storage unit that obstructed vision in rear view mirror was more
appropriate party for this task).
The failure of the assembler of the product, in a case against the component
manufacturer, to minimize the risk of damage was held to be the cause of plaintiff's
injury in Fierro v. International Harvester Co., 127 Cal. App. 3d 862, 869-70, 179
Cal. Rptr. 923, 926 (1982). Accord Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 95 Cal.
App. 3d 621, 629, 157 Cal. Rptr. 248, 252 (1979) ("Firestone could reasonably
believe that Ford Motor Co. would take appropriate measures to insure proper
installation of the valve stem"). Cf Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38 Colo. App. 435, 561
P.2d 355, 361 (1976), afJ'd, 196 Colo. 162, 172-73, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (1978) (en
banc) (component part manufacturer is strictly liable even when purchaser assem-
bled final product and component manufacturer supplied unguarded parts pursuant
to instructions of purchaser, who was expected to supply guards); State Stove Mfg.
Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss. 1966) (manufacturer held not liable for
supplying water heater without pressure relief valve but with instructions to installer
to add one); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 395, 451 A.2d
179, 183 (1982) (where it was feasible for component part manufacturer to install
safety device, manufacturer held strictly liable even though it fully complied with
owner's specifications which did not include a safety device); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972) ("[w]here such safety devices can
feasibly be installed by the manufacturer, the fact that he expects that someone else
will install such devices should not immunize him"); Mott v. Callahan AMS Mach.
Co., 174 N.J. Super. 202, 206-10, 416 A.2d 57, 59-61 (1980)(question of fact whether
to impose duty on manufacturer to install safety device).
66. Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1323. Many cases have recognized that the obligation
of the original wrongdoer can be replaced or shifted to a third party who has
knowledge of and control over the risk of harm. See, e.g., Strong v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 667 F.2d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1981)(applying Nebraska law)(manu-
facturer's failure to warn gas company of danger not proximate cause of explosion
because gas company had actual knowledge of danger); Nishida v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768, 733-74 (5th Cir. 1957) (applying Mississippi law)
(warning letter of defendant held an intervening act that severed chain of causation);
Mueller v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 494 F. Supp. 275, 278 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (employer's failure to guard opening in floor held superseding
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cause of injury); Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 693, 59 P.2d 100, 103
(1936) (defendant furnished defective lumber to plaintiff's employer, who used it to
build scaffolding even though he knew lumber was unsafe; employer's conduct held
to be superseding cause of plaintiff's injury); Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc., 435
N.E.2d 10, 15-16 (Ind. 1982) (plaintiff's foreman failed to warn plaintiff of defect;
judgment for manufacturer upheld); Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough,
PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9611 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (failure of store to heed
warnings of escalator manufacturer about need to make certain modifications on
escalator to be superseding cause issue if jury finds warnings sufficient); Ford Motor
Co. v. Atcher, 310 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky. 1957) (driver's knowledge that door of car
had history of suddenly opening held to relieve manufacturer of liability); Rekab,
Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 151, 274 A.2d 107, 113 (1971) (ferris
wheel manufacturer not liable for defect in product when he notified customer of
deficiency, shipped free replacement parts and offered free installation of new parts);
Rost v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., 616 P.2d 383, 386-87 (Mont. 1980) (owner's failure to
observe dangerous condition of elevator cable superseded liability of manufacturer);
Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 80, 86, 281 N.W.2d 520, 524
(1979) (manufacturer's failure to warn gas company not proximate cause of accident
if gas company had known of danger); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.,
11 N.Y.2d 62, 69-72, 181 N.E.2d 430, 434-35, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 412-14 (1962)
(callous refusal to pass on warning held to supersede manufacturer's conduct); Dra-
zen v. Otis Elevator Co., 96 R.I. 114, 120, 189 A.2d 693, 696 (1963) (store owner's
failure to respond to its knowledge of defects in escalator held to be proximate cause
of accident, relieving manufacturer of liability); Claytor v. General Motors Corp.,
286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982) (mechanic's improper pressure on lug nuts held
superseding cause of automobile collision); Steagall v. Dot Mfg. Corp., 223 Tenn.
428, 439, 446 S.W.2d 515, 520 (1969) (manufacturer's liability superseded by em-
ployee's action in putting solvent, whose corrosive nature employee was aware of, in
location where it could be spilled by person reaching for supplies); Ford Motor Co. v.
Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840, 844 (1946) (original owner's refusal to
accept free repair of defect held to be superseding cause of subsequent owner's
injury); Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 723-25, 591 P.2d 478, 481-82
(1979) (negligence of intermediate buyer with its own safety programs is superseding
cause; manufacturer not liable).
In arguably similar circumstances, other courts have refused to find a superseding
cause as a matter of law. See d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 892
(9th Cir. 1977) (although fiber manufacturer warned carpet manufacturer of fiber's
inherent flammability, fiber manufacturer not relieved of responsibility for hotel fire
because carpet manufacturer was aware of risk; such knowledge not a defense when
product is unreasonably dangerous because of its inherent unsuitability for the rea-
sonably foreseeable use, but is a defense when failure to warn is basis for claim);
Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1189-95 (5th Cir. 1978)
(applying Mississippi law) (manufacturer not relieved of duty to warn employees
despite employer's failure to warn inexperienced employees of dangers of which they
were ignorant; court suggested that plate attached to machine would have been more
effective than oral warnings); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp.
357, 370-72 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (failure of employee to use adequate dust control,
individual monitoring, or to warn of asbestos dangers not superseding cause as a
matter of law even if employer intentionally failed to warn); Balido v. Improved
Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 649, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 891 (1972) (manufacturer
advised purchaser of defect and offered to provide safety devices for $500; jury
question presented on issue of whether vendee's refusal to take up manufacturer's
proposal was superseding cause); Pepper v. Selig Chem. Indus., 288 S.E.2d 693, 696
(Ga. 1982) (manufacturer of combustible solution not relieved of responsibility by
acts of rebottler); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 180, 99
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The options available to Westinghouse when it first learned that
approximately one percent of its breakers had malfunctioned were
many. That it chose to investigate the problem, devise a remedy,
warn the purchaser of the dangers and offer free remedial measures67
is the the type of response that will save lives and lead to a safer
working condition. It is unfortunate indeed that this overriding policy
issue received so little attention from the Gracyalny court.
A more sympathetic approach to a post-sale measure is exhibited by
the Sixth Circuit in Schindler v. Lederle Laboratories.8 In that case,
the court rejected the argument of an injured polio vaccine user that a
post-sale warning of the risk of a harmful reaction should have been
made to his physician by the manufacturer's detail men in addition to
inclusion of the revised warning in the vaccine's package insert and in
a medical "Red Book."6
9
D. Incentives
The decision to issue a post-sale warning or to undertake post-sale
repairs or other remedial measures is not always an easy one. The
corporate manager must assess numerous tangible and intangible fac-
tors related to costs, benefits and risks. Legal, engineering, business,
humanitarian and public relations considerations may not always
encourage the same response. When either issuing a warning or re-
fraining from any action is arguably a reasonable decision in light of
the circumstances, no responsible manager would fail to ask whether
a risk reduction measure, which may or may not be legally required
and which may or may not reduce or eliminate a future product
liability problem, will intensify an existing problem by being con-
strued as an admission that the product as presently designed and
marketed is defective.
The admissibility of evidence of post-sale and post-accident reme-
dial measures, particularly in strict product liability, is an issue sur-
rounded by controversy. 70 Those who favor its admissibility contend
N.W.2d 627, 636 (1959) (fact that assistant service manager of dealership "forgot"
that car had "no brake" condition was not a superseding cause as a matter of law);
Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 176-77 (Miss. 1974) (dealer's failure to
relay manufacturer's message concerning defect in product to all users held not to be
a superseding cause).
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68. PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9900 (6th Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 25,166. For a more complete discussion of this case, see supra note 21
and accompanying text.
70. See authorities listed in Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695
F.2d 883, 886 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983). See also supra note 66.
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that a manufacturer will not forego making post-sale product im-
provements because evidence of these measures may be admitted in a
time-of-sale product liability case. No empirical study supports this
assumption and it is naive to suggest that a measure that increases the
likelihood of exposure to liability will not be a relevant consideration
whenever the benefits from the measure (including safety) are mar-
ginal .71
Fortunately, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is usually
excluded in negligence, 72 and the trend, at least in the federal courts
interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 407, favors the exclusionary
rule in strict liability. 73 A recent decision by the United States Court of
71. See generally Henderson, Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1983).
72. See, e.g., FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407 and numerous state counterparts,
such as ARIZ. STAT. ANN. R. EVID. 407 and CAL. CODE OF Evm. § 1151. Even in
negligence, the subsequent measure is admissible to show ownership, control and
feasibility of precautionary alternatives, as well as for impeachment purposes. Id.
Maine is the only state that generally admits such evidence in negligence. See ME.
RULE OF EvID. 407(a). See also, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th
Cir. 1980)(warning concerning side effects of drug), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981).
73. For federal cases, see, e.g., Cook v. McDonough Power Equip. Co., 720
F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1983)(post-design modification of lawn mower mot admissi-
ble because would confuse jury as to real question of whether product was defective
when sold); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th
Cir. 1983) (subsequent remedial measures are irrelevant on issue of defect); Hall v.
American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1982) (corrective policy
change to show previous unseaworthiness of vessel held inadmissible); Josephs v.
Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982) (subsequent warnings and instruc-
tions held inadmissible); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981)
(modification of design of transmission and change in owner's manual held inadmis-
sible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640
F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980)(evidence of post-accident change in bunk restraint
design in sleeping compartment in truck cab was properly excluded where feasibility
of alternative designs was not controverted); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1980) (subsequent revisions and inserts in patient's
pamphlets warning of dangers of use of contraceptive drug held inadmissible);
Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980)(warning of side effects of
drug that was alternative antibiotic to penicillin held inadmissible), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1080 (1981); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232
(6th Cir. 1980) (modification car door latch design held inadmissible); Roy v. Star
Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978) (post-accident repairs held inad-
missible), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805
(2d Cir. 1975) (applying New York law) (evidence of post-accident warnings ex-
cluded in mass-produced drug case). Compare DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697
F.2d 222, 227-28 (8th Cir. 1983) (evidence is admissible when strict liability is
governing standard, but in failure to warn case in which standard is negligence,
evidence is inadmissible) with Unterberger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603-04 (8th
Cir. 1977) (evidence admissible on strict liability) and Farner v. Paccar, 562 F.2d
518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977)(same). See also Longenecker v. General Motors Corp., 594
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Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service,
Inc. ,74 however, runs counter to this trend. In Herndon, the court
admitted a post-accident service bulletin requiring a post-sale design
change to an aircraft.75 The court noted that (1) a "tortfeasor" would
not risk litigation by foregoing design changes simply to avoid the use
of those changes as evidence,7 6 (2) insurers would not tolerate their
F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979) (question not reached as to whether Rule 407
includes subsequent remedial measures in strict liability case).
State court decisions admitting such evidence in strict liability cases include Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981); Ault v. International
Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 117-18, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814
(1974); Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 78, 565 P.2d 217, 223 (1977);
Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 111. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354, 1369 (1978) (post-
accident changes admissible in strict liability cases); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86
Nev. 408, 416, 470 P.2d 135, 140 (1970) (subsequent repair orders relevant to
defective condition of door); Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 151 N.J. Super. 422,
431, 376 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1977); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 125-26,
436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256-57, 417 N.E.2d 545, 551 (1981); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc.,
249 N.W.2d 251, 257 (S.D. 1976); D.L. v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 903-05 (Wis.
1983); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 100-01, 258 N.W.2d 680, 683-
84 (1977).
Among the state court decisions that have excluded the evidence in strict liability
are Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 134 Ariz. 208, 214-15, 655 P.2d 32, 38-39 (Ct.
App. 1982)(manufacturer of water heater placed warning labels on product subse-
quent to accident; court held evidence of labels inadmissible); Hallmark v. Allied
Prods. Corp., 132 Ariz. 434, 439-40, 646 P.2d 319, 324-25 (1982) (evidence of
subsequent installation of safety switch excluded); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 60-66, 388 N.E.2d 541, 558-60 (1979) (post-occurence
remedial measure, a "patient warning" mandated by Federal Drug Administration,
inadmissible); Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 385, 268
N.W*2d 656, 660 (1978)(evidence of design changes of forklift truck excluded), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J. Super. 462,
464-65, 266 A.2d 140, 141 (1970)(post-accident modification of safety belt inadmissi-
ble as evidence in strict liability action); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 270-72, 461
N.E.2d 864, 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (1984)(inadmissable in design defect and
warning cases); Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 293-94, 436
N.Y.S.2d 480, 484-85 (4th Dep't 1981)(design defect), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 550, 434
N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1984); La Monica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48
Ohio App. 2d 43, 45, 355 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1976)(in strict liability action, evidence
of subsequent modification admissible to show feasibility of alternative design but
not admissible to show defect); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474,
482-84, 573 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1978)(relevance of particular modification of product
should be weighed against its prejudicial impact if admitted as evidence).
74. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2170 (1984). The
Tenth Circuit also has recently held, contrary to most other federal decisions, that
state law governs the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures. Moe v. Avions
Marcel Dassaulte Brequet Aviation, 12 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) No. 7 (10th
Cir. 1984).
75. 716 F.2d at 1326-31.
76. Id. at 1327.
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insured's refusing to take remedial measures, 77 (3) governmental agen-
cies as well as juries contemplating punitive damages claims would be
unlikely to approve of such "callous" behavior,7 8 and (4) no proof
exists that manufacturers even know about the evidentiary rule or
adjust their behavior as a result of it.79
The court's reasoning in Herndon exhibits the need for a strict
exclusionary rule. If those who seek to improve their products are
blithely characterized by an appellate court as "tort feasors,' '8 0 and if
those who decide, after weighing all relevant facts, that a post-sale
remedial measure is not warranted are branded by the court as "cal-
lous," 81 then the need to insulate the post-sale decisions of corporate
managers from the deliberations of a jury would seem obvious.8 2
77. Id. at 1328.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. Additional reasons for excluding such evidence are:
(1) The probative value of such evidence is usually outweighed by its prejudicial
effect because subsequent remedial measures are not evidence that the product is
defective and can often be based on factors having nothing to do with defective
design. These factors include technological improvements, responses to regulatory
requirements, reasons of efficiency, cost reduction or aesthetics, or other reasons
unrelated to safety.
(2) In design defect and failure to warn cases the standard of responsibility is
virtually the same in negligence and strict liability, and therefore no basis exists for
distinguishing between a negligence claim and one based on strict liability. Because
strict liability warning cases ultimately ask the same "unreasonableness" question
that is asked about warnings in negligence cases, the exclusionary rule should apply
in all warning cases. In design defect strict liability cases, the "defect" question
ultimately is the same "reasonableness" question that is asked in negligence design
defect cases. That is, since "defect" in strict liability design cases has generally been
held to turn on either the reasonable consumer's expectations or on the balancing of
the various costs and benefits of the challenged design, and since the question the jury
must ask in a negligence case is whether the challenged design is reasonable, in view
of the various costs and benefits, strict liability design cases in most jurisdictions are
so similar to negligence cases that the exclusionary rule should apply to the former to
the same extent that it governs the latter.
(3) In most product liability cases, a negligence claim is usually joined with a strict
liability claim. A juror probably would be incapable of understanding why the
evidence is admissible as to one claim but not as to the other, particularly if negli-
gence is the test under both claims.
(4) The same reasoning which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures
in negligence cases should apply if the plaintiff is seeking punitive damages since the
focus of such actions is clearly on the manufacturer's conduct rather than on the
character of the product.
See Wheeler, Selected Evidentiary Issues of Importance in Product Liability Litiga-
tion, PRODUcT DESIGN LITIGATION 1023 (PLI 1981), as updated by Wheeler in
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A 1984 decision of the California Supreme Court, Schelbauer v.
Butler Manufacturing Co. ,83 also evinces a lack of understanding of
the plight of the manufacturer when faced with the dilemma of
whether to take a post-sale measure. In that case, the court held
evidence of a post-accident warning admissible in strict liability . 4
The accident occurred when Schelbauer slipped while installing roof-
ing panels that had been oiled to prevent corrosion. The manufacturer
had not received any complaints prior to this accident of a danger
associated with the excess oil or the slippery condition of the panels,
but shortly after the accident, it issued a warning about the slippery
condition . 5 Relying on its decision in Ault v. International Harvester
Co.,86 which sanctioned the admissibility in strict liability of subse-
quent changes in the product itself, the court reasoned that the deci-
sion in Ault was as applicable to a subsequent warning as to a subse-
quent change in the manufacture of design of the product.8 7
The court's failure to distinguish a design change from a post-
accident warning of a risk in the use of the product is difficult to
comprehend. A post-accident design change is at least arguably rele-
vant in some cases when the feasibility of that change at the time-of-
sale is an issue. But feasibility of a warning of a risk of harm is rarely
an issue in a product liability case as long as the manufacturer is
aware of the risk of harm;88 allowing a plaintiff to use a warning that
was motivated by his own accident as proof that the manufacturer
was aware of the risk of harm prior to that accident has an undeniable
boot strap quality to it.
Another difficult question concerns the admissibility of a remedial
measure undertaken after manufacture and sale of a product but
before an accident resulting from use of the product. A 1984 decision
by the New York Court of Appeals, Cover v. Cohen,89 seems correct in
deciding that such a measure is inadmissible to show that the product
as originally manufactured was defective. 90 The policy of encouraging
Wheeler & Allee, Selected Evidentiary Issues of Current Importance in Industrial
Equipment Product Liability Litigation, in PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 379 (PLI
1983).
83. PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9925 (Cal. 1984).
84. Id. at 25,266.
85. Id. at 25,264.
86. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
87. PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9925, at 25,264-66.
88. Henderson, Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of
Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 789 (1983).
89. 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984).
90. Id. at 270, 461 N.E.2d at 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
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post-sale product improvements and warnings9' is equally applicable
to pre-accident remedial measures as to post-accident remedial mea-
sures.92 Evidence of a manufacturer's action in either situation that is
admitted is equally prejudicial and furthermore is irrelevant on the
issues of time-of-sale knowledge and conditions.
Arguably, however, a post-sale but pre-accident remedial measure
may be admissible on the issue of whether the manufacturer had or
discharged a post-sale obligation. This question probably should turn
on the nature of the measure and its relevancy under the applicable
substantive law. For example, a post-sale warning, such as that in-
volved in Cover,9 3 which disclosed the nature and seriousness of the
post-sale product problem and the manufacturer's response thereto,
presents the strongest case for admissibility as these are the very facts
that determine whether a post-sale obligation exists and has been
satisfied. Conversely, a post-sale but pre-accident design change made
possible by an improvement in the state of the art should not be
admissible unless the court rules that the manufacturer had a duty to
warn past customers of safety related changes in the state of the art. 94
V. Conclusion
The principal issue in cases involving post-sale duties of product
manufacturers is not whether a better warning could have been given
or remedial measure undertaken. Any warning, for example, like any
judicial opinion or other written document, can be improved upon
with the benefit of hindsight. Rather, the fundamental issue is
whether a manufacturer's response to a very real, and sometimes
urgent, post-sale product problem is the type of corporate conduct
that should be encouraged rather than condemned. Unfortunately,
policy questions such as this usually arise in the context of personal
injury actions where the "concern for the victims" is the "paramount
policy. "95
A large degree of uncertainty inevitably will surround the time-of-
sale obligations of product manufacturers because of the numerous
91. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
93. The warning in Cover was a technical service bulletin sent to dealers thirteen
months after sale of a vehicle that acknowledged that some of these vehicles may
exhibit erratic idle speed.
94. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
95. Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc. 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 897, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119,
122 (1979).
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unknown variables. A relatively higher level of predictability is not an
unrealistic goal for the law of post-sale obligations. This objective,
however, will be defeated if, as in Gracyalny, the courts become
immersed in their efforts to conjure up factual issues for submission to
the jury.

